Why technology not always adds value to crisis managers during crisis:  The case of the Dutch nation-wide crisis management system LCMS by Groenendaal, J. & Helsloot, I.















Please be advised that this information was generated on 2021-11-04 and may be subject to
change.
Groenendaal & Helsloot Technology and Crisis Management 
 
CoRe Paper – Track Usability & Universal Design of ICT for Emergency Management 
Proceedings of the 18th ISCRAM Conference – Blacksburg, VA, USA May 2021 
Anouck Adrot, Rob Grace, Kathleen Moore and Christopher Zobel, eds.. 
Why technology not always adds value to 
crisis managers during crisis:  
The case of the Dutch nation-wide crisis 
management system LCMS 
  
Jelle Groenendaal 
The Hague University of Applied Sciences 
j.groenendaal@hhs.nl 
Ira Helsloot 




Technology undeniably plays an important role in supporting crisis managers to respond to crisis. However, when 
improperly designed or used, technology can be ineffective or even be detrimental to the crisis response. 
Therefore, in this paper we bring together insights from the scientific literature and identify 5 principles for the 
design and use of technology to aid crisis managers effectively. These principles might seem trivial but there are 
several examples of technology used in practice that show the opposite. To illustrate this, we examine as a case 
study the Dutch nation-wide crisis management system LCMS which is used in the Netherlands by all safety 
regions and other public organizations to maintain and share a common operational picture supporting large-scale 
crisis management collaboration. We explain why crisis evaluations and research time and again show that LCMS 
has failed to add value for crisis managers during crisis by using the identified principles. Implications for practice 
and research are provided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have pointed to the important role that (information) technology plays in supporting crisis managers to 
prepare for and respond during crisis (Comfort, 1993; Comfort et al. 2001; Ho & Kapucu, 2016). A few decades 
ago, Comfort (1993) identified three core functions that technology could play for crisis managers. First, 
technology allows the creation of interactive network for crisis managers, enabling communication and focusing 
attention on the same problem at the same time. Second, technology allows the development of a knowledge base 
for a given professional community, which can be used by crisis managers to make informed decisions. Third, 
technology supports the representation of information in graphic form and thereby simplifying complex data and 
increasing the speed and accuracy of the communication.  
Now decades later, these core functions still remain valid, although advances in technology have spawned new 
applications. However, as we argue in this paper, when improperly designed or used, technology can be useless 
or even be detrimental to the response to crisis. The aim of this paper is to discuss why technology sometimes 
does not live up to the expectations. Therefore, in this paper we bring together insights from the scientific crisis 
literature and identify 5 principles for the design and use of technology to aid crisis managers effectively. These 
principles might seem obvious, but in practice there are several examples that show that they are not always 
considered when developing or introducing new technology for crisis managers. To illustrate this point, we use 
as a case study the Dutch nation-wide crisis management system LCMS which is used in the Netherlands by all 
safety regions and other public organizations to maintain and share a common operational picture supporting 
large-scale crisis management collaboration. In this paper we explain why crisis evaluations (e.g. Scholtens et al. 
2015; Van Zanten et al. 2017; 2019) and research (e.g. Treurniet & Wolbers, 2020) time and again show that 
LCMS failed to add value for crisis managers during crisis by using the identified principles. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we will discuss LCMS and its functionality in more detail. Second, in 
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the research methodology, we will explain how we identified the principles and what data sources we used to 
compile our case study. Third, we will discuss the principles that we have identified based on the scientific crisis 
literature and discuss how they relate to our case study. Fourth, we conclude with the implications of our research 
for future research and practice. 
DUTCH NATION-WIDE CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM LCMS IN A NUTSHELL 
LCMS is a nation-wide crisis management system in the Netherlands to maintain and share a common operational 
picture supporting large scale intra- and inter-organizational crisis management collaboration. LCMS is used by 
all 25 safety regions, national and local water authorities, military police and emergency health care organizations. 
LCMS is aimed at supporting intra- and inter-organizational decision-making during crisis by facilitating the 
development of an up-to-date, consistent and common operational picture. LCMS can be used to share information 
within an organization as well as between organizations (LCMS, 2020). 
LCMS provides several functionalities. First, is offers the situation picture which can be regarded as the heart of 
LCMS (LCMS, 2020). This picture gives a quick overview of all relevant information from and for all actors and 
organizations involved. It consists of a textual and geographical part. LCMS Text is developed for composing and 
arranging a coherent, clear and actual situational picture. To support information managers, the default content of 
the textual fields includes a number of themes that are typically deemed relevant in crisis management. This 
includes meteorological information, safety and emergency workers and victim overview. LCMS Plot is created 
to build and maintain a geographical picture of the situation. For each participating team a separate drawing layer 




The five principles are derived from a literature review in which we examined two streams of research.   
The first stream of research consists of Naturalistic Decision Making or NDM studies (Lipshitz et al. 2001; Klein, 
2008; Schraagen & Van de Ven, 2008; 2011; Zsambok & Klein, 2014). NDM examines how experienced people 
make decisions under complex and challenging conditions such as uncertainty and time pressure. It is based on 
research in amongst others firefighting, aviation, rail, oil and gas, combat operations and medicine. NDM differs 
from traditional research on decision making in that it looks how decisions are made in practice (e.g. by putting 
decision makers in environments that closely resemble the reality of a crisis or investigating decision making 
during real crisis by conducting interviews and applying the critical decision method of Klein et al. 1989) as 
opposed to studying decision making in laboratory settings. NDM also differs from research on user interface and 
usability design which is usually concerned with questions like ‘can the user make the tool do what it is intended 
to do?’ (e.g. Tan et al. 2020). Although this is undeniably an important condition for technology to be effective, 
NDM goes further and considers whether technology actually helps crisis managers to make better decisions about 
the crisis response.    
In particular, we devoted attention to the scientific literature related to four primary NDM theories that, to our 
knowledge, have been used extensively to describe and explain decision making during crisis: Recognition-primed 
decision making (Klein, 2009), Endsley’s theory of situation awareness (Endsley, 1995), macrocognition and 
sensemaking (Schraagen et al. 2008) and distributed decision making models (Rasmussen et al. 1991). These 
theories are well documented in the scientific literature including implications to the use of technology. Reviewing 
these theories led to the identification of principle 1 (Technology supporting crisis response should also be 
regularly used before the crisis), principle 2 (Technology should help crisis managers to better make sense of 
already available data), principle 3 (Technology should support crisis managers distributed way of decision 
making) and principle 4 (New technology for crisis managers should reduce or keep cognitive task demands at 
the same level). 
The second stream of research is concerned with the body of knowledge related to self-reliance of citizens and 
first responders during crisis. As research has shown that the effectiveness of crisis response and disaster relief 
activities significantly relies on the self-reliance of citizens (e.g. Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004), we argue that 
technology should take emergent behavior of citizens into account and preferably enhance it.  
We have collected relevant scientific literature in several ways. First, we used search engine scholar.google.com 
by combining various search terms such as ‘technology’, ‘information technology’, ‘information systems’, 
‘naturalistic decision making’, ‘crisis management’ and ‘self-reliance’. Second, we used the same search terms to 
search the databases of relevant journals, such as the ISCRAM proceedings, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
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Management and Human Factors. Third, we obtained a number of relevant papers by looking in the reference list 
of papers found after applying search method 1 and 2. We used the following inclusion criteria. Included papers 
must be published in a peer-reviewed journal, conference proceedings or book Since technology is a broad 
concept, we have mainly focused on information systems and crisis management systems aimed at supporting 
crisis managers or teams.   
 
Case study 
LCMS was selected for the case study as both authors have acquired much experience with observing exercises 
and evaluating real events in which the system was used. We used Google’s search engine to collect data about 
the functioning of LCMS during exercises and real events. We applied (combinations of) the following search 
terms: ‘LCMS’, ‘crisis’, ‘crisis management’, ‘evaluation LCMS’ and ‘information management’. We included 
the following data sources: publicly available internal evaluations (e.g. conducted by safety region) and publicly 
available external evaluations (e.g. conducted by the Dutch Safety Inspectorate or a consultancy firm).  
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY DURING CRISIS 
Based on the scientific crisis literature we identified 5 principles that technology should meet in order to aid crisis 
managers during crisis effectively. These principles are not new but they have not been brought together as such.  
Since technology is a broad concept, the focus in this section lies on information and crisis management systems 
aimed at supporting crisis managers and teams. Every principle will be used to explain why (internal and external) 
evaluations show that LCMS in many cases adds little value for crisis managers. Examples of these evaluations 
including illustrative citations are provided per principle. 
 
Principle #1: Technology supporting crisis response should also be regularly used before the crisis  
NDM research has shown time and again that crisis managers tend to fall back on ingrained behavior during crisis 
(Lipshitz et al. 2001; Zsambok & Klein, 2014). Likewise, based on analysis on many large-scale emergencies, 
disasters and crises, Scholtens (2007) points out that crisis managers are likely to revert to what is standard practice 
when time is of the essence. This is also true for the technology crisis managers will use in the response to crisis. 
A good example is the use of WhatsApp. Crisis evaluations show that this technology is widely used by crisis 
managers including crisis management teams (Boin et al. 2020; Van Duin et al. 2019). Even though sometimes 
dedicated crisis information sharing platforms exist (e.g. LCMS), crisis managers tend to use what they are 
familiar with on a day to day basis. 
LCMS does not comply with this principle because the system is only (rarely) used by crisis managers during a 
major emergency, disaster or crisis. It should therefore come as no surprise that many evaluations show that LCMS 
is not (properly) used during (the initial phase of the) crisis or that it does not work because of technical issues. 
Table 1 provides a few examples. Evaluations show that crisis managers forget to fill or maintain LCMS with 
relevant data, do not always look into the system to collect the latest information or stick to communication means 
that they use on a daily basis such as telephone or radio.    
 
Year Evaluation Example 
2019 Veiligheidsregio Zuid-Limburg 
(2019) (internal evaluation) 
“In the first phase of the incident and prior to the first meeting of the operational crisis 
management team it provided difficult for the crisis communication process to obtain 
basic information. LCMS was not filled. As a consequence, crisis communication was 
not issued on time”   
“Members from different teams expressed their amazement at the failure of LCMS plot 
on mobile devices such as iPads” 
2015 COT Instituut voor Veiligheids- en 
Crisismanagement (2016) (external 
evaluation) 
“To support crisis management, the National Crisis Management System (LCMS) is used 
for information management. In this situation LCMS has been used differently. For 
example, the system was not used by the emergency dispatch center, while one of the 
action centers had recorded the results of an inventory of capacity at hospitals in the 
region in LCMS.” 
2011 Veiligheidsregio Zuid-Holland-
Zuid (2011) (internal evaluation) 
“In addition, many things were coordinated via mobile telephony, which meant that not 
everything could always be logged and / or included in the LCMS.” 
2011 Inspectie Openbare Orde en 
Veiligheid (2011a) (external 
evaluation) 
“Information management is not unambiguously dealt with during the handling of the 
incident. Some organizations cannot access LCMS. Other organizations that are 
connected do not use it or only make limited use of it. Information also becomes available 
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too late or is not shared.” 
2017 Van Zanten et al. (2017) (external 
evaluation) 
“Interviewees of the crisis management team indicate that they have made limited use of 
the possibility to look in LCMS” 
2012 Veiligheidsregio Utrecht (2012) 
(internal evaluation) 
“The strategic crisis management team used information from LCMS but did not add any 
information or decisions into the system. The contribution of the strategic crisis 
management team was hence not shared with other teams.” 
During the exercise, information was directly exchanged verbally by various officials. 
This information was not shared with the team in all cases, nor was it recorded (in LCMS 
or otherwise).” 
2015 Scholtens et al. (2015) (external 
evaluation) 
“The crisis team also did not take notice of the advice written down in LCMS” 
2011 Inspectie Openbare Orde en 
Veiligheid (2011b) (external 
evaluation) 
“According to the safety region, LCMS contains insufficient and outdated information. 
Because it is not possible to get in touch by telephone or via LCMS, the Rotterdan-
Rijnmond safety region sends a liaison to the area.” 
Table 1: Examples of evaluations addressing principle 1. 
 
It should be noted that this finding is not restricted to the Netherlands of LCMS. For instance, based on research 
in the Unites States, Ho & Kapucu (2016) observe that during crisis crisis managers tend to use the technologies 
they are used to use. The authors state that despite the rapid growth of new technologies, phone calls and face-to-
face meetings remain the prominent communication channels used by the majority of crisis managers. 
 
Principle #2: Technology should help crisis managers to better make sense of already available data  
Uncertainty is a defining characteristic of crisis and therefore crisis managers need to deal with it when responding 
to crisis (Boin et al. 2016). Often enabled by technology, one commonly used approach to reduce uncertainty is 
to gather more information and to disseminate it across the response network. Consider, for instance, the use of 
drones mounted with cameras by some Dutch fire brigades. This approach of gathering more information may 
work well for some types of uncertainty, but for others it can increase uncertainty and reduce performance (Klein, 
2009). Klein (2009) argues that gathering more information does not work in cases where uncertainty is caused 
by either a lack of trust (can I trust the information I receive?), conflicting information (what information is true?) 
and lack of understanding (what does the information mean?). And even if uncertainty is caused by simply not 
having the required information, gathering more information can be risky and lead to information overload. For 
instance, Marusich et al. (2016) found in several experiments that increased task-relevant volume did not improve 
task performance. In one of the experiment, the authors even found that task-relevant information volume reduced 
self-reported situational awareness and led to poorer task performance and situation awareness (Marusich et al. 
2016). Therefore, as Klein (2009) points out, in complex environments it is not about gathering more information 
but to find ways to better understand the information that is already available.  
Technology can help to better make sense of available data but it also can make it worse (Klein, 2009). As just 
discussed, technology should take into account and prevent the risk of information overload, that is to flood crisis 
managers with information which is not relevant for the task at hand. Therefore technology should be designed in 
such a way that it prevents the provision of too much and irrelevant information to crisis managers.  
LCMS does not fully comply with this principle. Although the use of LCMS does not necessarily has to lead to 
information overload, evaluations show that information noted in LCMS often does not help to get a common 
operational picture. Wolbers & Boersma (2013) studied the use of LCMS and stress that the development of a 
shared understanding of the situation requires more than simply assembling and presenting information from 
various response organizations into LCMS. According to Wolbers & Boersma (2013), information shared by 
response organizations is not univocal and a shared understanding of the situation only emerges when the different 
organizations take time to provide their interpretation of the information and negotiate its relevance for others. 
Notably, this process of jointly interpreting information and negotiating the relevance for others takes considerable 
time which often is not available in the first few chaotic hours of crisis (Scholtens et al. 2014).  
Table 2 provides some examples of evaluations that indicate that LCMS did not support in a better understanding 
of the available information. It shows that crisis managers are sometimes confused by the relevance or accuracy 
of information which sometimes led to a lack of confidence.  
 
Year Evaluation Example 
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2011 Veiligheidsregio Zuid-Holland-
Zuid (2011) (internal evaluation) 
“In the operational crisis management team, information in the LCMS was not always 
timely validated. As a result, the use of the wrong substance name was not timely noticed 
and corrected later.” 
“In addition, many things were coordinated via mobile telephony, which meant that not 
everything could always be logged and / or included in the LCMS.” 
2015 Scholtens et al. (2015) (external 
evaluation) 
“The examination of LCMS shows that information is usually inconsistent, multi-
interpretable and not always correct. This means that the sharing of crucial 
information within the crisis organization should not be done electronically. Crucial 
information must be transferred from person to person.”   
2019 Witteveen & Bos (2019) (external 
evaluation) 
“During the preparation of this evaluation, it appeared that the LCMS repeatedly 
contained incorrect data and was therefore not always a reliable source for drawing up 
the facts afterwards. 
“In the initial phase of the calamity, the LCMS was partly fed with opinions, facts and 
decisions. It was soon established that the category of opinions does not belong in the 
LCMS and can be disruptive” 
2012 Veiligheidsregio Utrecht (2012) 
(internal evaluation) 
“For all teams, the information from LCMS has not always been validated and analyzed 
for its significance for the team in question. The participants were not comfortable with 
the information in LCMS. Due to the large amount of (sometimes brief) information, the 
relevance of the teams involved was difficult to assess.” 
2015 Inspectie Openbare Orde en 
Veiligheid (2016) (external 
evaluation) 
“The national crisis management center creates a national incident in LCMS, which 
contains general information (e.g. contact details). However, an unambiguous (national) 
picture of the nature, extent, effects and possible duration of the power failure has not 
been established.” 
2012 Veiligheidsregio Groningen (2012) 
(internal evaluation) 
“De period of high water showed that during long lasting incidents too much information 
is added to LCMS. This makes it very difficult to keep pace with the actual information. 
This did not help in the decision making process.” 
2017 Van Zanten et al. (2017) (external 
evaluation) 
“Interviewees from the operational crisis management team indicate that they have the 
impression that their information was insufficiently visible at the tactical crisis 
management team. In addition, the interviewees indicated that the speed in meetings and 
the amount of information made it difficult to fill LCMS properly and at the same time 
look at the additions of others.” 
Table 2: Examples of evaluations addressing principle 2. 
 
Principle #3: Technology should support crisis managers distributed way of decision making  
A common assumption within crisis management is that it is possible to provide crisis managers at different levels 
(operational, tactical and strategic) within and between organizations with a common operational picture of the 
scene of the event. Technology is increasingly used to facilitate the development of a shared understanding of the 
situation at the scene of the event. LCMS is one example but there are more. Comfort et al. (2002) for instance 
report on the use of an university-wide information and collaboration system in the USA for emergencies and 
crises. According to the authors, this tool is aimed at increasing both the technical and organizational capacity to 
manage timely, accurate information exchange within and among organizations. 
However, research has questioned the assumption underlying these tools and consequently the need to develop 
technologies that facilitate the development of a common operational picture (Scholtens, 2008; Helsloot, 2008; 
Groenendaal et al. 2013). First and most importantly, Scholtens (2008) points out on the basis of numerous 
evaluations of large emergencies and crises that crisis managers work well together in the majority of cases, even 
if coordination and a common operational picture are lacking.  
Second, Helsloot (2008) and Scholtens et al. (2014) emphasize that in the first chaotic phase of the crisis, crisis 
managers often do not have much time to share information with others within and outside their organization, as 
this is often at the expense of the already scarce time available to fulfill the primary tasks such as extinguishing 
the fire, providing emergency care to casualties or restoring the public order.  
Third, the presence of a common operational picture does not necessarily result in or improve collaboration at the 
front line. Groenendaal et al. (2013) note that the extent to which crisis managers can be controlled by front line 
commanders is structurally overestimated by both practitioners and scholars. Even if front line commanders would 
have an actual common operational picture they often lack the ability to hierarchically direct the response efforts 
accordingly (Groenendaal et al. 2013; Groenendaal & Helsloot, 2016; Groenendaal & Helsloot, 2018).  
Fourth, researchers are skeptical about the extent to which remote tactical and strategic crisis management teams 
are able to make meaningful decisions based on the operational information provided by the crisis managers at 
the front line (Scholtens, 2008; Helsloot, 2008; Groenendaal et al. 2013). Treurniet & Wolbers (2020) for instance 
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emphasize that information acquired by crisis managers, as well as the uncertainty inherent in that information, 
cannot always be codified in time or in sufficient detail to provide the remote tactical strategic crisis management 
teams with input for decision making.   
By referring to distributed decision-making theory (DDM), Scholtens (2008) therefore argues that information 
systems should exist not to develop common operational pictures or to keep central crisis management teams 
informed, but to help decentralized crisis managers carry out their tasks. Groenendaal et al. (2013) proposed to 
apply the concept of stigmergy to crisis management, which is a form of self-organizing, bottom-up coordination 
in which activities are neither centrally controlled nor locally supervised; it is generated by placing signs and 
modifying the environment. Both concepts – DDM and stigmergy – emphasize the importance of supporting local 
decision making rather than enhancing central coordination and hence the need for a common operational picture.  
LCMS is not particularly aimed at supporting local decision making. Its objective is to facilitate the development 
of a common operational picture which can be used to centrally coordinate the response rather than enhance local 
decision making. As a consequence, it does not comply with principle 3.  
 
Principle #4: New technology for crisis managers should reduce or keep cognitive task demands at the same level   
Generally crisis managers do not benefit from new technologies that increase cognitive task demands during crisis 
(McLennen et al. 2007; Mosier, 2008; Mosier et al. 2012; Zsambok  & Klein, 2014). Militello et al. (2015) point 
out that newly introduced technology should never distract crisis managers from the unfolding situation as this 
may disrupt their ability to build and maintain situational awareness. The authors stress that it is important to 
avoid developing software tools that engage and distract users from their task at hand or interfere with other tools 
already be used. Therefore, the fourth principle implies that new technology (or features of it) should integrate 
with or replace existing technologies as much as possible in order to reduce the chance that its use will increase 
cognitive task demands of crisis managers during crisis. 
LCMS does not meet this principle as it is used in the Netherlands as an additional technology which only comes 
into play when multidisciplinary coordination is deemed necessary. LCMS is used on top of other technologies 
that are used on a daily basis by emergency response organizations to communicate and document information. 
Table 3 provides a few examples. Consequently, the use of LCMS by crisis managers is likely to increase the 
cognitive task demands which might negatively impact their ability to build and maintain a proper situational 
understanding.  
 
Year Evaluation Example 
2015 Scholtens et al. (2015) (external 
evaluation) 
“During the incident three different information systems have been used: LCMS, 
LiveJournaal and an internal chatbox.” 
 
“Due to the chaos, the police was already completely occupied with filling its own 
internal systems, so that the multidisciplinary system LCMS was not adequately filled 
and used in this case either.” 
2018 Van Zanten et al. (2019) (external 
evaluation) 
“The different participants in the crisis organization use different information systems. 
For example, several water managers used LCMS in addition to the sitrap module for 
net-centric work. Because these two information systems were used side by side, 
information was not always updated synchronously and sometimes archived twice. In 
addition to the use of the sitrap module and LCMS, a lot of information was also received 
by telephone and email.” 
2013 Veiligheidsregio Twente (2013) 
(internal evaluation) 
“Users indicate that they have little capabilities to use LCMS effectively. In addition, 
questions are being raised regarding the added value of LCMS. To fill the system with 
data, to read everything and to use it seems to be an aim in itself.” 
Table 3: Examples of evaluations addressing principle 4. 
 
Principle #5: Technology should consider and preferably enhance self-reliant behavior of citizens  
That ordinary citizens are self-reliant and also assist others during crisis is generally accepted within the disaster 
and crisis management community (Quarantelli, 1997; Perry & Lindell, 2013; Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2014). In 
fact, the literature even shows that the effectiveness of the crisis response depends to a large extent on self-reliance 
and the assistance provided by ordinary citizens (Scholtens & Groenendaal, 2011; Helsloot et al. 2014; Scanlon 
et al. 2014). Jurgens & Helsloot (2018) provide several examples of how citizens themselves use technology to 
foster community resilience before, during and after crisis. Scanlon et al. (2014) even go a step further and 
emphasize that helping citizens should be able to be connected to the response network and thus be given a formal 
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position. As a consequence, we argue that crisis response technology should take into account the fact that citizens 
are highly self-reliant and tend to provide assistance to response organizations or other fellow citizens if needed.  
LCMS does not cater for ordinary citizens and organizations that provide spontaneous support during large-scale 
emergencies, disasters and crises. This was also recognized by the state appointed committee that evaluated the 
Dutch law on safety regions (see table 5). The committee emphasized that information management should take 
into account actors who fall outside the official authority structures and suggested that LCMS should facilitate 
this.  
Year Evaluation Example 
2020 Evaluatiecommissie Wet 
veiligheidsregio’s (2020) (external 
evaluation) 
“Although information management is a constant point of attention in many 
evaluations of crisis and disasters, organizations and institutions involved in the 
provision of care are increasingly sharing information. However, current practices do 
not provide for identifying and bringing together actors who fall outside the authority 
structures.  
  
Table 4: Examples of evaluations addressing principle 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Technology such as information and crisis management systems can provide ample opportunities to support crisis 
managers and teams in their crisis response efforts. However, technology is not a panacea that can solve all issues 
in crisis management. As Klein (2009) notes, the use of technology during crisis helps us to pass some barriers 
but introduces others. Technology is not an end it itself – it must be a solution to a problem since every piece of 
new technology also introduces new challenges and issues that need to be overcome.   
In this paper we presented 5 principles derived from the scientific crisis literature and used them to explain why 
LCMS according to numerous evaluations does not add much value to crisis managers. First, LCMS is not used 
on a day to day basis and therefore it can be no surprise that it is not used (properly) during crisis. Second, 
evaluations show that crisis managers are often constrained by the information provided by LCMS as it is 
outdated, not correct or open to multiple interpretations. Consequently, LCMS does not help crisis managers to 
make better sense of the information that is already available. Third, LCMS is based on the wrong assumption 
that it is possible to develop and maintain a common operational picture during crisis and that crisis managers 
need this understanding to work effectively (together). Fourth, as LCMS is an technology on top of already 
existing technologies, it is likely to increases task work load instead of reducing it. This makes it more difficult 
for crisis managers to maintain their understanding of the situation. Fifth and finally, LCMS does not facilitate 
the adoption of self-reliant behavior of citizens and organizations while there is much evidence that they should 
get a position in the crisis response effort.  
As the principles identified in this research are based on existing research and hence not new, the question can be 
raised why they are not embedded in the design of information and crisis management systems such as LCMS. 
We think that there are several reasons for this. It could well be that designers of information systems are mainly 
focused on designing systems that meet the needs of certain targets group (e.g. information managers) without 
looking into whether the underlying goal (i.e. better crisis response) is also achieved. Another reason may be that 
information systems are initially designed in accordance with the five principles, but that concessions have been 
made during implementation and rollout or the system is not used as designed so that much of its effectiveness is 
lost. Finally, we know that it takes a while before scientific knowledge about crisis management is adopted in 
practice. Exemplary is the scientific knowledge base about citizen response during crisis which is still not always 
reflected in the plans of professional emergency organizations (Scanlon et al. 2014).  
The practical implications of our findings are twofold. First, the principles identified in this research can be used 
(together with other and more generic user interface and usability principles) by developers of crisis information 
systems and other technology to design tools that actually facilitate and improve crisis management decision 
making by crisis managers and teams. Second, developers and users of the LCMS technology can use the 
principles to ensure that LCMS will contribute more to the effectiveness of crisis management. For instance, 
developers could think about ways to integrate LCMS in other tools that are used by crisis managers on a daily 
basis. Or invent new features that enable information managers to integrate emergent behavior of ordinary citizens.  
Our research also provides starting points for further research. First, we encourage researchers to investigate more 
thoroughly how technology benefits the effectiveness of the crisis response. This means that researchers need to 
go further than just asking direct users of technology whether the tool has been helpful for doing their work. We 
recommend that scholars also consider the extent to which tooling leads to better decision making by crisis 
managers and ultimately better crisis management. For instance, this can be done by interviewing frontline 
personnel about the quality of orders they received from a crisis management team that used a crisis information 
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tooling. Second, we recommend researchers to aid the development of technology by following the principles 
identified in this paper. This implies for instance designing and testing technology that takes into account human 
factors (e.g. heuristics and biases related to information processing and decision making) and the distributed way 
of decision making during the first few hours of crisis.     
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